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The King Can Truly Do No Wrong: Governmental Immunity
and Rights Relative to the Crown in North Carolina After
Bynum*
Under our system the people, who are [in England] called
subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to
the person of the monarch. The citizen here knows no person,
however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to
whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him when
it is well administered.1
—JUSTICE SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER
INTRODUCTION
The notion that government entities—federal, state, or local—
are largely or entirely exempt from defending ordinary actions in
court has long enjoyed the comfort of being treated as “an established
doctrine.”2 Indeed, despite originating entirely as a creature of
common law, the courts of North Carolina view the doctrine as so
well established that they have, for at least the last four decades,
entirely ceded any responsibility for modifying or abrogating the rule
to the North Carolina General Assembly.3 Despite the considerable

* © 2015 Stefan Schropp.
1. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882).
2. See id. at 207 (“[T]he exemption of the United States and of the several States
from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has . . . been
repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given,
but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 164
(1868) (“Now, no principle at common law is better settled than that the government is
not liable for the wrongful acts of her public agents.”); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386,
389 (1850) (“No maxim is thought to be better established, or more universally assented
to, than that which ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the sovereign,
cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed under its own
authority for the fulfillment merely of its own legitimate ends. A departure from this
maxim can be sustained only upon the ground of permission on the part of the sovereign
or the government expressly declared . . . .”); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of
Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C. 102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (“It is an
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a
state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless by statute it has consented to
be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.”).
3. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971)
(“[A]ny further modification or the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should
come from the General Assembly, not this Court.”).
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confusion4 and disdain5 surrounding the doctrine, both the courts and
the general assembly have shown minimal interest in either revisiting
the doctrine’s historical (mis)conceptions or curtailing its
contemporary application.6
The present-day scope of the doctrine of governmental immunity
in North Carolina was recently outlined in Bynum v. Wilson County,7
where a majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina effectively
barred plaintiffs from bringing claims for harms occurring on any
county or municipal property.8 By framing its holding in the language
of precedent and underscoring its reluctance to modify or repeal the
doctrine of governmental immunity without the general assembly’s
consent, the majority implicitly argued that its holding was
representative of the current state of affairs in North Carolina.9
However, as this Recent Development will suggest, the holding could
have new and far-reaching effects on the remedies available to
potential plaintiffs injured on government property, while presenting
a renewed opportunity to examine the contemporary appropriateness
of a doctrine that could generously be described as “unsound.”10
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of
governmental immunity in North Carolina by examining the case law
that serves as the backbone of this common law doctrine. Part II
presents the facts at issue and analyzes the competing opinions in the

4. See, e.g., Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014)
(Martin, J., concurring) (“Despite efforts over many years to bring clarity and
predictability to the law of governmental immunity, this goal has remained somewhat
elusive.”).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426
(1987) (“ ‘[S]overeignty’ has become an oppressive concept in our courts. A state
government that orders or allows its officials to violate citizens’ federal constitutional
rights can invoke ‘sovereign’ immunity from all liability—even if such immunity means
that the state’s wrongdoing will go partially or wholly unremedied.”); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2001) (“Sovereign immunity is
an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American law.”).
6. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 589, 184 S.E.2d at 239 (holding that
“any . . . modification or the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come
from the General Assembly, not this Court”).
7. 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014).
8. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (Martin, J., concurring) (“This reasoning would seem
to create a categorical rule barring any premises liability claims against counties or
municipalities for harms that occur on government property.”).
9. See id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (majority opinion) (“The rule set out by the Court
of Appeals . . . is inconsistent with our precedent on governmental immunity. Accordingly,
we reverse th[at] decision . . . .”).
10. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243 (“It may well be that the logic of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its
adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was adopted.”).
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Bynum court’s recent decision, which dramatically altered the law of
governmental immunity in North Carolina. Part III continues the
discussion by arguing that the concurring opinion in Bynum was the
correct one, both in terms of respecting precedent and limiting the
effects of this anachronistic doctrine. Finally, Part IV uses the Bynum
decision to reconsider the foundation and merits of governmental
immunity and urges the general assembly to find that the doctrine,
derived from long-discredited notions of royal infallibility, is
indefensible under both the United States and North Carolina
constitutions and is generally inconsistent with the purposes of
assigning tort liability.
I. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN NORTH CAROLINA
Before turning to the impact and implications of the Bynum
decision, it is important to examine the jurisprudential development
of governmental immunity in North Carolina. While Part IV of this
Recent Development will examine the contemporary criticisms of the
doctrine and the responses of several state legislatures to those
critiques, this Part focuses exclusively on the evolution of the doctrine
and the case law that provides a backdrop for a full consideration of
the decision in Bynum. Section A of this Part briefly sketches the
foundations of the doctrine in the State and provides the necessary
perspective for a full consideration of the court’s task in Bynum.
Section B of this Part details the North Carolina courts’ attempts to
delineate a line of case law establishing the boundaries of local
government liability.
A. The History of Governmental Immunity in North Carolina
For well over a century, North Carolina has recognized the rule
of governmental, or sovereign, immunity,11 under which a county or

11. Historically, sovereign immunity applied to the state and its agencies while
governmental immunity applied to municipal corporations. Older rulings held that
“[c]ounties are not, in a strictly legal sense, municipal corporations, like cities and towns”
and “[i]n the exercise of ordinary governmental functions, they are simply agencies of the
state.” O’Berry v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 198 N.C. 357, 360, 151 S.E. 880, 882 (1930).
However, more recent decisions have erased both the distinction between governmental
and sovereign immunity and the distinction between counties and municipalities for the
purpose of immunity. See, e.g., Bynum, 367 N.C. at 359–60, 758 S.E.2d at 646–47 (finding
that Wilson “County is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of governmental
immunity” and using “municipality” in a discussion of Wilson County); Estate of Williams
ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 204, 732
S.E.2d 137, 144 (2012) (expressing no opinion “on whether [the county] in this case [is]
ultimately entitled to governmental immunity”).
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municipality “is immune from suit for the negligence of its employees
in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of
immunity."12 The courts of North Carolina have long held as “an
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound
public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or
elsewhere unless by statute it has consented to be sued or has
otherwise waived its immunity from suit.”13 By extension, “a
subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory
governmental functions . . . may be sued only when and as authorized
by statute.”14
However, governmental immunity has not, at least historically,
been without limits. Traditionally, the doctrine “covers only the acts
of a municipality or a municipal corporation committed pursuant to
its governmental functions.”15 According to the historical conception
of the doctrine, governmental immunity did not apply when a county
or municipality engaged in a proprietary activity by “undertak[ing]
functions beyond its governmental and police powers and engag[ing]
in business in order to render a public service for the benefit of the
community for a profit.”16 The question of governmental immunity
has, therefore, traditionally turned on whether the alleged conduct
arose from an activity that was governmental or proprietary in
nature.17 A governmental function is an activity that is “discretionary,
political, legislative, or public in nature and performed for the public
good on behalf of the State rather than for itself.”18 Conversely, a
12. Williams, 366 N.C. at 198, 732 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Evans ex rel. Horton v.
Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004)); see Moffitt v. City of
Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 255, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (adopting the doctrine of governmental
immunity by stating a city or town “incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers”
acting under authority conferred by its charter or for the sole benefit of the public); see
also Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) (“This
Court has not departed from the rule of governmental immunity adopted in the year
1889.”).
13. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C.
102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 785,
787 (1952)).
14. Id. (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1952)).
15. Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Evans ex rel Horton v. Hous.
Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. Id. (quoting Town of Grimesland v. City of Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 123, 66
S.E.2d 794, 798 (1951)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293
(1952)). Examples of activities that North Carolina courts have held to be governmental
include the operation of a public library, see Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library,
264 N.C. 360, 361, 141 S.E.2d 519, 519 (1965) (per curiam) (“The operation of a public
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proprietary function is “commercial or chiefly for the private
advantage of the compact community.”19
Given that “any further modification or the repeal of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General
Assembly, not this Court,”20 North Carolina’s “threshold inquiry in
determining whether a function is proprietary or governmental is
whether, and to what degree, the legislature has addressed the
issue.”21 In the absence of a statute that preempts governmental
immunity, when a county or municipality is “acting in the exercise of
police power, or judicial, discretionary, or legislative authority,
conferred by its charter or by statute . . . it is not liable.”22 Therefore,
as the court’s language in Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v.
Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department makes clear, the
threshold question is not only whether the legislature has addressed
the localities’ ability to act, but also to what degree it has addressed
the question.23 If the legislature has merely granted counties
permission to act on an issue, the degree to which it has addressed the
question, in the courts’ view, is substantially less and the activity is
therefore more likely to be proprietary. In contrast, if the legislature
has required counties to act, the activity is more likely to be
governmental.24 Accordingly, courts have focused on the statutory
language granting counties the authority to act on certain matters.25
Highlighting this important distinction between permissive and
required statutory language, several North Carolina statutes grant
legislative authority to counties to perform functions that have

library meets the test of ‘governmental function,’ as stated in repeated decisions rendered
by this Court.”), and the operation of a register of deeds office, see Robinson v. Nash
Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1979) (finding that the operation of a
register of deeds office “is clearly a governmental function for which the county enjoys
immunity from suit for negligence”).
19. Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Britt v. City of Wilmington,
236 N.C. 446, 450, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1952)). Examples of activities that North Carolina
courts have held to be proprietary in nature include the operation of a convention center,
see Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1965), and the act of
contracting for the construction of a sewer system, see Town of Sandy Creek v. E. Coast
Contracting, Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 741 S.E.2d 673, 674 (2013).
20. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971).
21. Williams, 366 N.C. at 200, 732 S.E.2d at 141–42.
22. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 46, 59 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1950)
(emphasis added).
23. Williams, 366 N.C. at 200, 732 S.E.2d at 141–42.
24. See id.
25. See McIver v. Smith, 134 N.C. App. 583, 586, 518 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1999) (“It is also
noteworthy that the legislature granted counties the power to operate ambulance services
in all or part of their respective jurisdictions.”).
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traditionally been held to be proprietary—not governmental—
functions.26 For example, pursuant to one statute, counties may
construct, own, and operate other public enterprises, including
airports and public transit systems.27 Yet courts have held that such
“public enterprises are proprietary by nature” and do not entitle
counties to governmental immunity.28 In these instances of permissive
language, the grant of legislative authority has historically been
considered instructive and “noteworthy” but not determinative.29
B.

Consideration of Governmental Immunity by the North Carolina
Courts

Given that the ultimate determination of whether an activity is
governmental or proprietary therefore turns on the degree to which
the legislature has addressed the issue—a “fact intensive inquiry” that
“may differ from case to case”30—the courts’ approach to previous
inquiries outlines the boundaries of the doctrine. The cases that
follow show not only that the courts are willing to find that a
permissive grant from the legislature fails to designate a specific
activity as governmental but also that the courts have been willing to
distinguish proprietary portions of an inherently governmental
activity to assign liability to a locality.
Aaser v. City of Charlotte,31 one of North Carolina’s leading cases
on governmental immunity prior to Bynum,32 clearly tracks the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions. In
Aaser, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a “city is
engaging in a proprietary function . . . the liability of the city . . . to the
plaintiff for injury, due to an unsafe condition of the premises, is the
same as that of a private person or corporation.”33 Based on this
26. See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-274 to -275 (2013).
28. McIver, 134 N.C. App. at 588, 518 S.E.2d at 526; see also Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C.
App. 693, 699, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1990) (“Non-traditional governmental activities such
as the operation of a golf course or an airport are usually characterized as proprietary
functions.”).
29. See generally McIver, 134 N.C. App. at 586, 518 S.E.2d at 525 (explaining that the
focus should be on the nature of the service rather than the provider of the service).
30. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2013)
(quoting Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation
Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 203, 732 S.E.2d 137, 143 (2012)), rev’d in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758
S.E.2d 643 (2014).
31. 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965).
32. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 361, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin,
J., concurring) (leading with Aaser to show that the majority’s approach is “inconsistent
with our long-standing precedent”).
33. Aaser, 265 N.C. at 497, 144 S.E.2d at 613.
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reasoning, the court held that by operating and leasing a coliseum,
Charlotte had engaged in a proprietary activity and could incur
liability for injuries sustained on the premises.34 In contrast, cases
where the defendant county was engaged in a clearly governmental
activity have established a precedent that precludes liability where the
plaintiff was injured on government property, such as by falling down
the steps of a register of deeds office35 or a government-owned
library.36
However, even if a county provides a governmental service in the
broadest sense, it may still be liable if a specific part of that service is
proprietary. In Williams, a case very similar to Aaser, an individual
drowned in a public park that was owned and operated by the
defendant, Pasquotank County.37 However, the drowning occurred in
an area of the park known as the “Swimming Hole” that was rented
out to private parties in exchange for a fee.38 The trial court, in an
order upheld by a unanimous court of appeals panel,39 denied the
county’s motion for summary judgment based on governmental
immunity and ruled that the county “charged and collected a
fee . . . [while] providing the same type of facilities and services that
private individuals or corporations could provide.”40 In reviewing the
lower courts’ decisions, the state supreme court acknowledged that
the general assembly had statutorily established that the “creation,
establishment, and operation of parks and recreation programs is a
proper governmental function”41 but remanded the case for further
consideration of whether the “specific operation of the Swimming

34. See id. at 501, 144 S.E.2d at 616 (ultimately concluding that the evidence “does not
justify an inference that such activity was either dangerous or recurring or known to the
city” and granting the motion for judgment of nonsuit).
35. Robinson v. Nash Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1979) (holding
that the operation of a register of deeds office “is clearly a governmental function for
which the county enjoys immunity from suit for negligence”).
36. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 361, 141 S.E.2d 519,
520 (1965) (per curiam) (“The operation of a public library meets the test of
‘governmental function,’ as stated in repeated decisions rendered by this Court.”).
37. 366 N.C. 195, 196, 732 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2012).
38. Id. at 196–97, 732 S.E.2d at 139.
39. Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t,
211 N.C. App. 627, 632, 711 S.E.2d 450, 454 (2011).
40. Order Denying Defendants’ Limited Motion for Summary Judgment at 69, Estate
of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, No. 08 CVS
927, 2009 WL 8666345 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2009).
41. Williams, 366 N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-351
(2013)).
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Hole component of [the park], in this case and under these
circumstances, [was] a governmental function.”42
Likewise, in Town of Sandy Creek v. East Coast Contracting43 the
court again parsed governmental authority and noted that, although
the “construction of a sewer system is a governmental function[,]” the
“allegations of breaches of the duty of reasonable care [arising from
contracts to build that sewer system] do not concern decisions of
government discretion.”44 Thus the court found that “a local
governmental unit acts in a proprietary function when it contracts
with engineering and construction companies, regardless of whether
the project under construction will be a governmental function once it
is completed.”45 This ruling solidified the premise of Williams—that
even where a county is operating under a broad grant of statutory
authority, the courts should continue to determine whether the
specific operation at issue is a governmental or a proprietary function.
Therefore, the courts’ jurisprudence has firmly established a
precedent under which judges must first evaluate whether, and to
what degree, the legislature has addressed the issue in question. If the
legislature has not addressed the activity or has merely given counties
permission to engage in the activity without requiring that they do so,
the activity is, at least historically, unlikely to be viewed as
governmental and therefore immunized from suit. However, where
the legislature is silent or merely permissive, the courts have also
viewed the determination of whether an activity is proprietary or
governmental to be a “fact intensive inquiry” that may “differ from
case to case.”46 It was against this precedential backdrop that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina took up the appeal in Bynum.
II. BYNUM V. WILSON COUNTY
Notwithstanding the extensive jurisprudential history of
governmental immunity claims in North Carolina, a majority of the
supreme court in Bynum not only found that the legislature had
addressed the maintenance of public buildings to a much greater
degree than had previously been contemplated but eschewed much, if
not all, of the fact-specific investigation that had guided previous
inquiries. Section A of this Part sets out the facts and procedural
42. Id. The case has not been resolved on remand.
43. ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 673 (2013).
44. Id. at ___, 741 S.E.2d at 675–76.
45. Id. at ___, 741 S.E.2d at 677.
46. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2013)
(quoting Williams, 366 N.C. at 203, 732 S.E.2d at 143).
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history of Bynum, while Sections B through D detail the competing
logic of the opinions put forth by the court of appeals, the supreme
court’s majority, and the supreme court’s concurrence. While an
analysis of the merits of each of the three positions is reserved for
Part III, the precedential teachings provided by the cases in Part I are
particularly relevant to the consideration of the opinions detailed
below.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Defendant-Appellant Wilson County leased an office building
(“Miller Road Building”) where it housed a number of county
departments and divisions, including “the county commissioners
meeting room, the planning department, the inspections department,
the water department, the finance department, the human resources
department, and the office of the county manager.”47 PlaintiffAppellee James Earl Bynum entered the Miller Road Building on
April 15, 2008 to pay his water bill.48 After paying his bill, Mr. Bynum
fell while walking down the front exterior steps of the building and
sustained serious injuries resulting in paralysis of his legs and right
arm.49
Mr. Bynum subsequently filed a complaint, which, after
amendment, alleged that defendants
negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and repair the Miller
Road building steps, failed to meet the requirements of the
North Carolina Building Code, failed to install a required
handrail, failed to be aware of and warn of a hidden danger,
and failed to ensure that the Miller Road building was
accessible to the public in a safe condition.50
After Mr. Bynum’s death, his wife (“Ms. Bynum”) continued “the
action both in her individual capacity and as administratrix of [the]
estate” and amended “the complaint to assert a wrongful death
claim.”51
In February 2012, Wilson County filed a motion for summary
judgment asserting, inter alia, governmental immunity.52 The trial

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 356, 758 S.E.2d 643, 644–45 (2014).
Id. at 356, 758 S.E.2d at 645.
Id.
Id. at 357, 758 S.E.2d at 645.
Id.
Id.
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court denied the motion,53 and the defendants subsequently
appealed.54 Although it dismissed the “non-immunity-related
challenges” as interlocutory in nature, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals ruled on the trial court’s determination of governmental
immunity by following established precedent from the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.55
B.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals

Following Wilson County’s appeal of the trial court’s order
denying its motion for summary judgment, a three-judge panel of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reconsidered the lower court’s
decision. Adhering to the well-established precedent of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina,56 a unanimous court of appeals determined
that “the proper designation of a particular action of a county or
municipality is a fact intensive inquiry, turning on the facts alleged in
the complaint, and may differ from case to case.”57 In examining the
facts of Bynum, the court of appeals relied heavily on precedent—
including Aaser, Sandy Creek, and Williams—and focused both on the
nature of the defendant-government’s actions and on the interaction
between defendant and plaintiff.58
The court of appeals’ interpretation of this precedent led it to
conclude that the determinative factor in deciding if “a particular
injury resulted from a governmental or proprietary activity is the
nature of the plaintiff’s involvement with the governmental unit and
the reason for the plaintiff’s presence at a governmental facility.”59
While material, “the underlying tasks which the governmental entity
allegedly performed in a negligent manner” are not dispositive of
liability.60 Therefore, “where a plaintiff is injured as a result of his or
her involvement with a governmental function . . . the relevant
governmental entity is immune from suit. . . . [But] if a plaintiff is
injured as a result of his or her involvement with a proprietary
53. Order at 496, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., No. 08 CVS 2443, 2012 WL 11818632, at *1
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
54. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 357, 758 S.E.2d at 644–45.
55. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 307 (2013), rev’d
in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014).
56. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[W]e
have performed case-by-case inquiries in our previous governmental immunity cases.”).
57. Bynum, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 302 (quoting Estate of Williams ex rel.
Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 203, 732 S.E.2d
137, 143 (2012)).
58. Id. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 303.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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function . . . then governmental immunity is not available.”61
Accordingly, the court ruled that since North Carolina has “long held
that a municipal corporation selling water for private consumption is
acting in a proprietary capacity and can be held liable for negligence
just like a privately owned water company,”62 the trial court did not
err in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
governmental immunity grounds.63
C.

The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion

Following the court of appeals’ rejection of its appeal, Wilson
County requested further review from the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. In language that now reads more like a roadmap to the
court’s eventual conclusion than a synopsis of the hurdle that laid
before the county, the plaintiff identified Wilson County’s burden on
appeal:
The case here passes every test argued by Wilson County
and the various amici except one—that if any part of a building
is used for a governmental purpose then the entire building,
steps, parking lot and land are immunized from suit despite the
fact proprietary functions are also taking place on site. This
Court has never gone there.64
In taking up Wilson County’s appeal from the lower court, the
majority of the supreme court not only jumped at the above
“invitation” from the plaintiff-appellee’s brief, but also apparently
extended governmental immunity to include any building that is
owned, used, constructed, or maintained by a county—whether or not
that building is used (in whole or in part) for a governmental
purpose.65 In short, the majority of the court not only went where it
has never gone before but, apparently, beyond.
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority—in a statement that
both the court of appeals and the concurring justices would likely
agree with—begins her analysis with the observation that the

61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Fussell v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 225, 695
S.E.2d 437, 440 (2010)).
63. Bynum, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 307.
64. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ New Brief at 25, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 758
S.E.2d 643 (2014) (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6901617, at *26.
65. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 361, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin,
J., concurring) (“This reasoning would seem to create a categorical rule barring any
premises liability claims against counties or municipalities for harms that occur on
government property.”).
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availability of governmental immunity “turns on whether the alleged
tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity
that was governmental or proprietary in nature.”66 This threshold
statement of law is consistent with the long-standing jurisprudence on
governmental immunity detailed in cases like Williams, Aaser, and
Sandy Creek. However, in applying the test established by cases like
Williams67 to determine if a specific activity is governmental or
proprietary, the majority opinion broke sharply from precedent in a
shift made clear and denounced by the concurrence.
The focal point of the majority’s concern with the lower court’s
decision, and its basis for departing from precedent, was that the
court’s reasoning would “subject[] different plaintiffs injured by the
same act or omission to different immunity analyses on the basis of
their reasons for visiting the same county property.”68 The supreme
court, relying heavily on Williams, firmly stated that the rule set out
by the court of appeals was inconsistent with established precedent.69
Moreover, the majority found that the general assembly had
statutorily assigned the “responsibilities of locating, supervising, and
maintaining the county buildings that provide [discretionary,
legislative, or public] functions.”70 Specifically, the majority focused
on Chapter 153A of the North Carolina General Statutes, which
requires all counties in North Carolina to “supervise the maintenance,
repair, and use of all county property”71 and “to perform duties and
responsibilities associated with enforcing State and local laws and
ordinances relating to, inter alia, construction and maintenance of
buildings.”72 Directly after citing these statutes, the majority found
that the legislature had addressed this activity to a sufficient degree to
rule it a governmental activity under Williams and summarily
concluded that “the fact that the legislature has designated these
responsibilities as governmental is dispositive.”73 Without so much as
discussing the effect of this holding on rulings such as Aaser or Sandy

66. Id. at 358, 758 S.E.2d at 646 (majority opinion) (quoting Estate of Williams ex rel.
Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 199, 732 S.E.2d
137, 141 (2012)).
67. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
68. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647.
69. See id. (“The rule set out by the Court of Appeals . . . is inconsistent with our
precedent on governmental immunity.”).
70. Id.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-169 (2013) (emphasis added).
72. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-351 to
-352 (2013)).
73. Id.
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Creek, the majority opinion reversed the lower courts’ decisions and
remanded.74
D. The Supreme Court’s Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion75 wastes little time in voicing the concern
“that the reasoning employed in the majority opinion may
categorically bar claims for harms occurring on county or municipal
property.”76 While acknowledging the shortcomings of the “efforts
over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the law of
governmental immunity[,]”77 the concurring opinion correctly notes
that Bynum upends existing precedent.78 Justice Martin notes that the
majority would reject Aaser and instead find that “a municipality that
owns and operates a sports arena to produce revenue would be
immune from claims arising from its failure to properly maintain its
facility.”79 Likewise, in Williams, the majority’s reasoning would have
rendered moot the fact “that the County charged rental fees for use
of the ‘Swimming Hole’ in which the decedent drowned—because the
property was owned by the County.”80
In contrast to the majority, the concurring justices’ analysis
turned on the question of whether the building itself served a
governmental—rather than proprietary—function. The concurring
opinion notes that the Miller Road Building, “which is open to the
public, houses the county commissioner’s meeting room, the county
manager’s office, and several county departments, including water,
finance, planning, inspections, human resources, and geographic
information systems.”81 Additionally, the Miller Road Building
provides the citizens of Wilson County a “convenient location . . . to
access numerous government offices and services” and, as the
majority pointed out, “serves the County’s discretionary, legislative,
and public functions, several of which only may be performed by the
Wilson County government.”82

74. Id.
75. The concurring opinion was written by Justice Martin and was joined by Justices
Edmunds and Beasley. Id. at 360–362 (Martin, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (“This result is inconsistent with our long-standing
precedent.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 648.
81. Id. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648.
82. Id.
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Using this line of reasoning, the concurring opinion arrives at the
same result as the majority while addressing the majority’s legitimate
concern of “subjecting different plaintiffs injured by the same act or
omission to different immunity analyses on the basis of their reasons
for visiting the same county property.”83 While that concern may in
fact be legitimate, the concurrence makes clear that the majority
opinion was not a necessary outcome in this case. Indeed, under the
concurring opinion’s holding, Mr. Bynum—visiting the Miller Road
Building for a proprietary reason—would be treated no differently
than someone visiting the building to attend a meeting of the county
commissioners, to register a deed, or to take advantage of any
number of the other governmental services offered at the building. As
instructed by precedent, the three concurring justices focus on the
“character of the municipality’s acts, rather than the nature of the
plaintiff’s involvement”84 and hold in no uncertain terms that “this
multi-use governmental office building undoubtedly serves a
governmental function . . . [and a]ccordingly, plaintiffs’ claims are
barred by governmental immunity.”85 Thus the concurrence both
respected precedent and avoided the unfortunate circumstance of
treating similarly situated plaintiffs disparately based on the reason
for their involvement with the county. By disposing of the issue
without so much as mentioning the reason for Mr. Bynum’s presence
at the Miller Road Building, the concurrence implies that the majority
need not have upended governmental immunity precedent in
contravention of its own edict that “any modification or the repeal of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General
Assembly, not th[e] Court.”86
III. THE CONCURRING OPINION WAS THE CORRECT—AND
PREFERABLE—INTERPRETATION
This Part argues that the concurring opinion was both the correct
result in terms of respecting precedent on the issue and also the better
result in terms of limiting the corrosive effect of the doctrine of
governmental immunity in North Carolina. As the concurrence points
out, the majority opinion in Bynum expands the doctrine of
governmental immunity to cover injuries occurring on any
governmental property. This result is not in keeping with the court’s
previous jurisprudence and eschews the precedent established by
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (majority opinion).
Id. at 359, 758 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring).
Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971).
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cases like Williams. The concurring opinion deftly sidesteps the
majority’s professed need to expand the coverage of the doctrine and,
in so doing, correctly constrains governmental immunity to its
precedential moors. Instead, the Bynum majority has enacted a much
broader categorical bar than any previous precedent—one that
precludes premises liability for any property owned or leased by a
county.
In fairness to the majority, the plaintiff’s assertion that the “case
here passes every test argued by Wilson County and the various amici
except one”87 is not an accurate representation. Indeed, two separate
briefs argued that the court of appeals’ failure to consider the
statutory authority for counties to acquire property (including by
lease)88 and to supervise the maintenance, repair, and use of all
county property89 is grounds for reversal under the Williams test as
required by statute.90 In its brief on appeal to the supreme court,
Wilson County argued that its “statutory obligations to engage in
inspection and maintenance of governmental property demonstrate
that these acts are performed for the public good and are
governmental in nature.”91 Likewise, the amicus curiae brief from the
North Carolina League of Municipalities clearly notes that the
opinion of the court of appeals “contains no references to Chapter
153A of the North Carolina General Statutes” and suggests that, if it
had, the lower court would have found that the “[r]esponsibility to
supervise maintenance, repair, and use of county property is
delegated, again by statute, to boards of county commissioners.”92
These briefs argue that if the court of appeals had taken Chapter
153A into account, it would have found the activity in question to be
governmental in nature and therefore immunized from suit by
governmental immunity.
What these briefs fail to identify, and why the concurring opinion
was correct in sidestepping the argument, is how a finding that
Chapter 153A of the General Statutes immunizes municipal
governments from premises liability would square with the North
Carolina courts’ historical treatment of these types of actions. Indeed,
while both of these briefs make extended use of Williams as the
87. Plaintiff-Appellees’ New Brief, supra note 64, at 25.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-158 (2013).
89. Id. § 153A-169.
90. See infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
91. Defendant-Appellant Wilson County’s New Brief at 21, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty.,
367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014) (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6143823, at *21.
92. North Carolina League of Municipalities’ Amicus Curiae Brief at 18, Bynum, 367
N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6143826, at *18.
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leading case on governmental immunity, neither argues that the
Williams court’s failure to mention Chapter 153A was an omission
worthy of revisiting. Remarkably, the court’s extended discussion of
governmental immunity in Williams seems all but wasted considering
that the second paragraph of that opinion states that the alleged
negligence occurred at a public park that was “owned by defendant
Pasquotank County and maintained and operated by defendant
Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department.”93 If Chapter
153A immunizes counties from premises liability, as the majority
concludes, then the fact that the park was owned by Pasquotank
County should have been the end of any discussion regarding their
liability. Indeed, the court’s ruling in Williams would seem to suggest
that if Mr. Bynum had been injured while inside the water
department’s offices, a proper inquiry would be whether the provision
of water service was a governmental or proprietary function.94 But
post-Bynum, as the concurrence points out, that distinction, along
with Sandy Creek’s demarcation between the governmental act of
providing sewer service and the proprietary act of contracting for the
construction of a sewer95—to make no mention of the entirely
proprietary act in Aaser—no longer appears to merit consideration.96
Moreover, neither the briefs for Wilson County and the North
Carolina League of Municipalities nor the majority opinion in Bynum
acknowledge the gallons of ink expended in the fact-specific
inquiries97 of previous governmental immunity claims. Under the

93. Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t,
366 N.C. 195, 196, 732 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2012).
94. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 361–62, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring)
(“[U]nder the majority’s reasoning, it would have been irrelevant in Estate of Williams
that the County charged rental fees for use of the ‘Swimming Hole’ in which the decedent
drowned—because the property was owned by the County . . . and therefore the County
had the statutory responsibility to maintain and repair the property, making the County
immune to the tort claim. Rather than issuing such a holding in Estate of Williams, we
remanded to the Court of Appeals, explaining, ‘[E]ven if the operation of a parks and
recreation program is a governmental function by statute, the question remains whether
the specific operation of the Swimming Hole component of [the county-owned public
park], in this case and under these circumstances, is a governmental function.’ ” (citations
omitted)).
95. Town of Sandy Creek v. E. Coast Contracting, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 741
S.E.2d 673, 677 (2013).
96. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (2014) (Martin, J., concurring) (“By
adopting what seems to be a categorical rule, the majority opinion may inadvertently
broaden the scope of governmental immunity.”).
97. See, e.g., Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302
(2013), rev’d in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014) (“[T]he proper designation of a
particular action of a county or municipality is a fact intensive inquiry . . . .”); Williams, 366

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1972 (2015)

1988

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

Bynum court’s new conception of governmental immunity, the
discussion of premises liability should have begun and ended where
the property in question was a public library,98 the register of deeds
office at the county courthouse,99 a series of public parks,100 or other
premises associated with the government.101 Yet, in each of these
prior cases, the result turned on the question of whether the property
supported activities that were governmental or proprietary in
nature.102 Despite maintaining that precedent supports the holding in
Bynum, neither the briefs in support of the appellee’s position nor the
majority opinion explain why these previous discussions were
necessary—or even relevant—in light of the interpretation of Chapter
153A that each urges.
To be certain, the position advocated by the plaintiff and
ultimately adopted by the court of appeals would have equally
upended governmental immunity jurisprudence in the state of North
Carolina had the supreme court affirmed it. When confronted with
the court of appeals’ holding, the majority opinion was right to be
concerned that the existing quagmire of governmental immunity
jurisprudence would be exacerbated by a rule that subjects “different
plaintiffs injured by the same act or omission to different immunity
analyses on the basis of their reasons for visiting the same county
property.”103 Indeed, the inconsistent outcomes that would inevitably
result from such a test are perhaps the best argument in favor of
respecting the precedential cases that ignored the plaintiffs’ actions
and focused exclusively on the acts of the municipality.104 As the

N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (“Whether defendants are entitled to governmental
immunity in this case turns on the facts alleged in the complaint.”).
98. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 360, 141 S.E.2d 519,
519 (1965) (per curiam).
99. Robinson v. Nash Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 33–34, 257 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1979).
100. E.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 196, 732 S.E.2d at 139 (publicly owned park, “Fun
Junktion,” with a “Swimming Hole” rented out to private parties); Glenn v. City of
Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 470, 98 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1957) (publicly owned, for-profit recreation
ground).
101. See, e.g., Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1965)
(city-owned sports coliseum).
102. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (“[T]he question remains
whether the specific operation of the Swimming Hole component of Fun Junktion, in this
case and under these circumstances, is a governmental function.”).
103. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin, J.,
concurring).
104. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (“In determining whether an
entity is entitled to governmental immunity, the result therefore turns on whether the
alleged tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity that was
governmental or proprietary in nature.”).
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concurring opinion deftly illustrates, however, this concern did not
necessitate the adoption of a novel interpretation of governmental
immunity to avoid treating similarly situated plaintiffs differently. By
maintaining focus on the character of Wilson County’s actions—and
not on those of the plaintiff—the concurrence avoids this inherently
unfair result and exposes the flaw in the majority’s concern with the
opinion from the court of appeals.
The ease with which the three concurring justices arrive at the
conclusion that “this multi-use governmental office building
undoubtedly serves a governmental function”105 is eclipsed only by
the fact that they would have granted governmental immunity to
Wilson County without mentioning the reason for Mr. Bynum’s
presence at the building. In fact, nowhere in their opinion do the three
concurring justices find it relevant to mention that Mr. Bynum was
there to pay a water bill or that the provision of water service is an
inherently proprietary function of government. Not only is this
approach in line with the courts’ precedent that it is the acts of the
municipality, and not those of the plaintiff, that are relevant to
governmental immunity,106 but it also limits the scope of the factspecific inquiry to be undertaken. Moreover, the concurrence avoids
the expansive reading of Chapter 153A adopted by the majority to
protect the defendant county. Perhaps more than any other aspect of
the opinions, the concurring justices’ handling of the concerns raised
by the court of appeals’ opinion suggests that the majority opinion is a
solution in search of a problem.
From Bynum emerges a categorical rule that bars premises
liability for any property owned or leased by a county based on the
majority’s broad—and unnecessary—reading of Chapter 153A’s
delegation of the responsibility to supervise the maintenance and
repair of all county property. If the majority’s concern regarding
disparate treatment for similarly situated individuals were well
founded, the result in Bynum could perhaps be understood as
necessary despite its precedential inappropriateness. However, the
ease with which the three concurring justices dispatched that concern
demonstrates that this result was not required. Instead, the majority
holding in this case uses Chapter 153A to unnecessarily broaden the
scope of governmental immunity beyond its already unsound
105. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (“In determining whether an
entity is entitled to governmental immunity, the result therefore turns on whether the
alleged tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity that was
governmental or proprietary in nature.”).
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moorings.107 However, as the next Part argues, the general assembly
can and should return a semblance of accountability to the doctrine.
IV. A CALL TO ACTION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Although the decision significantly muddied the waters of
governmental immunity, what remains clear after Bynum is that
North Carolinians continue to confront a problem in desperate need
of a solution. Fortunately, the courts have consistently recognized the
general assembly’s authority to modify or abrogate the doctrine of
governmental immunity in the state. This Part argues that, in light of
the court’s expansion of governmental immunity in Bynum, it is now
incumbent on the general assembly to clarify and limit the doctrine.
To that end, this Part briefly overviews the actions taken by other
state legislatures before turning to the argument, advanced by a
number of contemporary scholars, that governmental immunity can
no longer be normatively justified as sound public policy.
Although the rule that emerges from Bynum may prove less
unwieldy than its predecessors due to its threshold reliance on
Chapter 153A,108 it exacerbates the disconnect between the current
state of governmental immunity and the underlying policy that
originally gave rise to the doctrine. The doctrine of governmental
immunity has long been fraught with inconsistencies and worrisome
consequences that the legislature would have been wise to address.
Yet after Bynum, the need for action is even more pressing. On the
one hand, the long-held conception that governmental immunity rests
exclusively on public policy grounds109 is difficult to square with the
general assembly’s nearly complete abdication of its responsibility to
define the scope of that policy interest.110 On the other hand, it is

107. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring). To be
certain, the doctrine of governmental immunity was well-entrenched prior to the Bynum
ruling. See Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972)
(“This Court has not departed from the rule of governmental immunity adopted in the
year 1889.”). However, as the court has previously noted and as Part IV of this Recent
Development argues, even the historical conception of the doctrine was unsound and in
desperate need of review from the legislature. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C.
589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971) (“It may well be that the logic of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its adoption are not as
forceful today as they were when it was adopted.”).
108. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647.
109. See N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364
N.C. 102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (finding that governmental immunity is “an
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy”).
110. As recently as 1995, the general assembly attempted to reform municipal
governmental immunity but was unable to pass any meaningful legislation. See Jeremy D.
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difficult to interpret the judiciary’s professed lack of a cohesive
standard111 and repeated acknowledgement that changes to the
doctrine should come from the legislative branch112 as anything less
than a repeated request to take up an issue that increasingly belongs
less to the common law and more to its statutory counterpart.113
Although the ruling in Bynum suggests that courts may be willing,
albeit inadvertently, to modify governmental immunity,114 their
continued reluctance to explicitly do so requires that the general
assembly address this issue.
A. National Legislative and Judicial Reception to the Doctrine
In fairness to the general assembly, only three states expressly
recognize absolute immunity in their constitutions115 while only one
state allows government tortfeasors to be sued to the same extent as
their private counterparts.116 But despite a growing number of states
that have transitioned from defining governmental immunity through
common law to setting its boundaries by statute, North Carolina has
proven remarkably content to allow the judiciary to continue to
Arkin, Recent Development, Police Chase the Bad Guys, and Plaintiffs Chase the Police:
Young v. Woodall and the Standard of Care for Officers in Pursuit, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2468,
2493 (1997). However, the general assembly has passed legislation permitting a
municipality to waive immunity through the purchase of insurance or risk-sharing pools.
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
111. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Despite
efforts over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the law of governmental
immunity, this goal has remained somewhat elusive.”); see also Evans ex rel. Horton v.
Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 54, 602 S.E.2d 668, 671 (2004) (“We have provided
various tests for determining into which category [(governmental or proprietary)] a
particular activity falls . . . .”).
112. E.g., Steelman, 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243 (“[A]ny modification or the
repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly,
not this Court.”).
113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
114. The courts have not explicitly abandoned the stance that “the repeal of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly.” Steelman, 279
N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. However, as Justice Martin points out, the holding in
Bynum does modify the doctrine and “may inadvertently broaden the scope of
governmental immunity.” Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J.,
concurring).
115. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a
defendant in any court of law or equity.”); ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 (“The State of
Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”); W. VA. CONST. art. 6,
§ 35 (“The state of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law or
equity . . . .”).
116. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (West 2006) (“The state of
Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for
damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person
or corporation.”).
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define the doctrine.117 Considering only legislation that would have
affected the Bynum decision, at least thirteen states have abolished
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions118
that has caused so much consternation in North Carolina courts119 and
that serves no purpose within the broader framework of public
policy.120 Additionally, a growing number of states have chosen to
statutorily identify the instances in which a government entity has
117. North Carolina is nowhere to be found among either the thirty-three states that
have statutory immunity for discretionary government functions; the twenty-four states
that recognize immunity for issuance, denial, or revocation of a license; or the twenty-four
states that recognize immunity for failure to inspect or make adequate inspection of
property. Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 805 & n.28, 807 & nn.33–34
(2007).
118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-903 (2012) (“[E]very governmental entity is subject to
liability . . . whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.”); IOWA CODE
§ 670.2 (2015) (“[E]very municipality is subject to liability . . . whether arising out of a
governmental or proprietary function . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (2014) (“[E]very
municipality is subject to liability . . . whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary
function.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (West 1999) (“[T]he ‘state’ and its ‘political
subdivisions,’ . . . are not now, have never been and shall not be liable, and are, always
have been and shall continue to be immune from suit at law or in
equity . . . notwithstanding that any such act, omission or breach constitutes or may be
considered as the exercise or failure to exercise any duty, obligation or function of a
governmental, proprietary, discretionary or ministerial nature and notwithstanding that
such act, omission or breach may or may not arise out of any activity, transaction or
service for which any fee, charge, cost or other consideration was received or expected to
be received in exchange therefor.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(A)(1) (LexisNexis
2008) (“[A] political subdivision is not liable . . . in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 152.1 (West 2008) (“The state [and]
its political subdivisions, . . . whether performing governmental or proprietary functions,
shall be immune from liability for torts.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (2007) (“[E]very
public body is subject to civil action for its torts . . . whether arising out of a governmental
or proprietary function . . . .”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32A-3 (2004) (“[A]ny public
entity is immune from liability for damages whether the function in which it is involved is
governmental or proprietary.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (2012) (“[A]ll
governmental entities shall be immune from suit . . . from the activities of such
governmental entities wherein such governmental entities are engaged in the exercise and
discharge of any of their functions, governmental or proprietary.”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.92.090 (West 2006) (“The state of Washington, whether acting in its
governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages . . . .”); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29-12A-4 (LexisNexis 2008) (“[T]he provisions of this article shall apply to both
governmental and proprietary functions.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-102 (1996) (“[T]his
act abolishes all judicially created categories such as ‘governmental’ or ‘proprietary’
functions and ‘discretionary’ or ‘ministerial’ acts previously used by the courts to
determine immunity or liability.”); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421,
424 (Me. 1987) (“Since the ‘proprietary activity’ exception to sovereign immunity has its
source solely in the common law, . . . that exception has been abrogated by the Tort
Claims Act.” (internal citation omitted)).
119. See supra note 4.
120. See infra Section IV.C.
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immunity, rather than defaulting to immunity in the absence of a
statutory waiver.121 Some states specifically permit a government
entity to be sued only in instances of injuries caused by the condition
or use of public property.122
However, despite frequently expressing skepticism about both its
merits123 and the consistency of its application124 and acknowledging
the changing judicial reception to it in other jurisdictions,125 North
Carolina courts have maintained that “the repeal of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly.”126 In
light of the courts’ steadfast refusal to revisit the issue, it is critical
that the general assembly move to limit the doctrine. In doing so, the
general assembly should note—and this Part argues—that the
doctrine should be significantly curtailed as both repugnant to the
notion of government accountability contained in the state’s
constitution and subversive to the compensation and deterrence
policy rationales that underlie tort law.

121. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 805–09 (“For example, thirty-three states recognize
discretionary-function immunity, twenty-three recognize immunity for injuries caused by
reliance on statutes or other enactments, twenty-three immunize the collection of a tax,
seventeen immunize specified intentional torts of public employees, and forty states confer
immunity from punitive damages. Other common immunities conferred on state and local
governments or their employees include immunity for issuance, denial, or revocation of a
license; a failure to inspect or to make an adequate inspection of property; the adoption or
failure to adopt legislation or other legislative functions; acts or omissions in the execution
or enforcement of the law; the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings; the
plan or design for public improvements; the condition of property or facilities used for
recreational purposes or of unimproved public property; a failure to provide adequate
police service or protection or to provide adequate jails or other corrections or penal
facilities; the probation, parole, release, or escape of arrestees, convicts, or prisoners; a
failure to provide adequate firefighting or other emergency service; a failure to provide
adequate medical care or to prevent disease or impose a quarantine; and specified
unintentional torts.”).
122. See id. at 809–10 & n.48.
123. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971)
(“It may well be that the logic of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that
the reasons which led to its adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was
adopted.”).
124. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin,
J., concurring) (“Despite efforts over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the
law of governmental immunity, this goal has remained somewhat elusive.”).
125. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242 (“Since 1957 fifteen jurisdictions,
in addition to Florida, have overruled or greatly modified the immunization of
municipalities from tort liability.”).
126. Id. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243.
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Governmental Immunity Undermines Accountability To the
People

In a case that has been quite fairly termed the “fountainhead of
all of our constitutional law,”127 Chief Justice John Marshall succinctly
stated that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury.”128 If this statement remains true today—and
there is no reason to suspect it does not—it presents serious questions
about the constitutionality of a doctrine that creates an impenetrable
barrier to those who would claim the protection of the laws. The
foundation for the doctrine itself can be found nowhere in the
Constitution.129 Beyond being unable to locate the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine, at least two noted constitutional
scholars, Erwin Chemerinsky and Akhil Reed Amar, have concluded
that the immunity “doctrine conflicts with too many basic
constitutional principles to survive.”130 While these arguments may
someday prove compelling to the United States Supreme Court, it is
the North Carolina Constitution to which our state courts and the
general assembly should turn for guidance on this issue.
The principle that the government of this state must be
accountable to her people is firmly embedded in the North Carolina
Constitution,131 and the doctrine of governmental immunity runs so
contrary to that notion as to be unsupportable. If, as Professor Amar
has suggested, the opening phrase of the U.S. Constitution, “We the
people,”132 makes the citizens sovereign and embodies the principle of
127. James Rosen, Video and Transcript: 2011 FOX Interview with Rehnquist, FOX
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/09/04/video-and-transcript2001-fox-interview-with-rehnquist/ (interview taken May 21, 2001).
128. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
129. To refute originalist supporters of sovereign immunity, Professor Chemerinsky
argues that “[t]he text of the Constitution is silent about sovereign immunity. Not one
clause of the first seven articles even remotely hints at the idea of governmental immunity
from suits. No constitutional amendment has bestowed sovereign immunity on the federal
government.” Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1205. For the nonoriginalists, he offers a
lengthy rebuke of the notion that “sovereign immunity is a value that should be seen as
embodied in the Constitution.” Id. at 1210–16.
130. Id. at 1203; see also Amar, supra note 5, at 1426 (“A state government that orders
or allows its officials to violate citizens’ federal constitutional rights can invoke ‘sovereign’
immunity from all liability—even if such immunity means that the state’s wrongdoing will
go partially or wholly unremedied.”). Although both authors center their respective
critiques of state sovereign immunity against allegations of a citizen’s federal
constitutional rights, there is no reason to believe that there should be less of a remedy
when the violation is physical instead of constitutional.
131. See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text.
132. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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government accountability to them,133 then surely the opening phrase
of the state constitution, “We, the people of the State of North
Carolina,”134 confers no less a responsibility on our state officials.135
Moreover, the courts of North Carolina need not make Professor
Amar’s logical leap from “We the people” to citizen sovereignty.136
Indeed, the state constitution goes beyond its federal counterpart and
expressly provides that “[a]ll political power is vested in and derived
from the people; all government of right originates from the people, is
founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of
the whole.”137
Furthermore, others have argued that the First Amendment’s
right-to-petition clause, which guarantees the “right of the people . . .
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,”138 clearly
establishes “the right of the individual to seek redress from
government wrongdoing in court, a right historically calculated to
overcome any threshold government immunity from suit.”139 But the
North Carolina Constitution affirms that right in even more specific
language than its federal counterpart. Indeed, the North Carolina
Constitution grants the people a right “to apply to the General
Assembly for redress of grievances”140 while also quite separately
granting them the right to “remedy by due course of law” for “an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation” to “be
administered without favor, denial, or delay.”141 Certainly, it is
difficult to imagine how Bynum was “administered without favor”
when the court granted immunity based solely on Wilson County’s
standing as a government entity.
While the United States and North Carolina implicitly and
explicitly reject all manner of royal prerogatives, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity undeniably descends from the English legal
maxim that “the King can do no wrong.”142 As Professor Chemerinsky

133. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1449–50.
134. N.C. CONST. pmbl.
135. Id.
136. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1449–50.
137. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
138. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
139. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
899, 980 (1997).
140. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
141. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
142. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1201; see also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 87 (1989) (explaining the
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has detailed at the federal level, “government accountability can be
found in many parts of the Constitution” and “[s]overeign immunity
is inconsistent with this basic precept.”143 This statement is no less
true at the state level. In fact, it may be more true, given that the state
constitution provides for additional protections and the connection
between the sovereign and her citizens is, if anything, greater than at
the federal level.144
C.

Governmental Immunity Is Not a Sound Public Policy

Despite common misuse in contemporary American
conversation, the phrase “begging the question”145 is rightly reserved
for circular arguments like the cursory and oft-repeated axiom of
North Carolina courts that governmental immunity “rest[s] on
grounds of sound public policy.”146 In a manner that ill fits a doctrine
enjoying such longevity, the truth of this proposition has long been
assumed without the proof normally required of such an assertion.
The court’s insistence on this well-established doctrine, which has
significant and often harmful repercussions for individuals, suggests
that it ought to be firmly based in a sound public policy rationale. Yet
the case law’s silence on what exactly this policy rationale is suggests
that it must be revisited and explored in greater depth.
Cases like Bynum present a rare opportunity to revisit the
justifications for the doctrine and reevaluate—rather than just
accept—the proposition that governmental immunity is grounded in
sound public policy reasoning.147 This Section does just that by
evaluating the doctrine under the two most commonly accepted

origins of sovereign immunity in English law); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY app. B at 1956
(10th ed. 2014) (“Rex non potest peccare. The king can do no wrong.”).
143. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1214.
144. See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV.
835, 874 (2004) (“And, yet, there is a kernel of truth that remains to the proposition that
the state governments are, at least relatively, closer to the people than is the federal
government.”).
145. See, e.g., Philip B. Corbett, Begging the Question, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 25,
2008), http://afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/begging-the-question-again/?_r=0
(noting frequent misuse of “begging the question” in the New York Times and providing
the correct definition as “refer[ring] to a circular argument . . . that assumes as proved the
very thing one is trying to prove”).
146. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C.
102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010).
147. While this section focuses exclusively on the public policy of immunizing localities
from tort liability, other justifications for the doctrine could be offered. To the extent that
such potential justifications merit consideration, they were not addressed by the Bynum
court and are outside the scope of this Recent Development.
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rationales for tort liability: the need to compensate injured individuals
and the need to deter future tortious acts.148
1. Compensation
While it appears that no body of scholarship has taken the
position that injured individuals do not deserve to be compensated,
many writers have taken issue with the equity of compensating
injured individuals at the expense of fellow citizens who bear little or
no responsibility for the injury.149 Arguments that taxpayers are the
proper party to bear this economic cost, since they are, by and large,
the voters responsible for electing the responsible government
officials,150 have encountered marked hostility and have been
unpersuasive to those jurisdictions that continue to immunize local
governments against tort liability.151 Critics of allowing government
liability based on the compensation rationale have concluded that
“[a]t most, we are left with an argument for providing those injured
by tortious government conduct with some form of publicly funded
insurance—although . . . the justification for having taxpayers fund
this obligation rather than leaving the insurance decision to each
individual is entirely unclear.”152
However, the general assembly’s grant of legislative authority
permitting local governments to waive immunity through the
purchase of liability insurance and participation in risk-sharing
pools153 provides some insight into the true public policy of this state.
North Carolina’s decision to grant authority to local governments to
purchase insurance or participate in local government risk pools with
a cost to be ultimately borne by the taxpayers seems difficult to
148. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1216; see also Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 824
(pointing out the Supreme Court’s “repeat[ed]” reasoning that constitutional torts both
effectively compensate the injured and also provide adequate deterrence, before
discussing the difficulties of this view).
149. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 827 (noting that the argument cannot apply
to those who voted against current elected officials and that, whereas shareholders can
always sell their shares and they do exercise effective control, taxpayers are limited by the
cost of moving and the one-man-one-vote principle).
150. See Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and
Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 923 (2001).
151. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 827 (“But this is hardly corrective justice from
the standpoint of those voter-taxpayers who backed the losing candidate in the last
election. Moreover, a shareholder who is dissatisfied with management policy may always
sell, but a taxpayer can relocate to another jurisdiction only at considerable cost. And
taxpayers do not have the kind of effective control over government policy vested in
owner-shareholders.”).
152. Id. at 826.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(a) (1999).
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square with the alleged public policy rationale behind sovereign
immunity—that citizens have no economic obligation to indemnify
the government for its own negligent actions. At the very least, this
legislative enactment suggests that the state’s public policy is that
local governments should pursue the most cost-effective means to
ensure that a remedy exists for citizens injured by governmental
malfeasance. But if we are to understand that the public policy of this
state is that taxpayers should not be made to compensate individuals
injured by government negligence, then the purchase of insurance
surely runs counter to that proposition. Certainly the general
assembly would not allow local governments to expend taxpayer
funds on the purchase of insurance if it is an unnecessary expenditure,
given that they will otherwise never be liable for their negligence.154
In light of Bynum, there appears to be no reason for the general
assembly to permit, or for local governments to undertake, the
wasteful and unnecessary purchase of premises liability insurance
given the court’s treatment of Chapter 153A and its unwillingness to
subject them to the liability covered by such a policy.
Moreover, it may be suggested that continuing to uphold the
doctrine of governmental immunity represents a value judgment that
protecting citizens from paying their marginal share of compensation
is more important than guaranteeing the right of injured individuals
to receive compensation.155 If this is truly the value judgment that has
been made, it is not justified by any of the legislative enactments or
judicial opinions on the topic. Further, this argument flies in the face
of the United States Supreme Court’s statement that injuries caused
by state actors should not be borne solely by the injured:
[I]t is the public at large which enjoys the benefits of the
government’s activities, and it is the public at large which is
ultimately responsible for its administration. Thus . . . it is fairer
to allocate any resulting financial loss [from tort liability] to the
inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than

154. See, e.g., Gerald R. Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State
and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L.J. 588, 594 (“[Although in] most states statutes now
authorize the purchase of liability insurance covering specific immune governmental
activities . . . absent such authorization, the courts have held the purchase to be ultra vires
as well as a wasteful, unnecessary expenditure of public funds.” (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
155. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 826 (“[S]ince the economic cost of damages awards
falls on taxpayers not responsible in any direct fashion for tortious conduct, the correctivejustice rationale for governmental damages liability for common-law torts is also
wanting.”).
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to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose
rights . . . have been violated.156
Where the general assembly has indicated through its
authorization of local governments to purchase liability insurance that
it is not opposed to taxpayers bearing a marginal cost for the
protection of those injured by government malfeasance, the argument
that it is the public policy of this state not to place the burden of tort
liability on citizens largely breaks down. Moreover, if the general
assembly is prepared to sanction the supreme court’s approach in
Bynum through continued silence on the topic, it should also be
prepared to defend the implicit normative judgment that a citizenry
that reaps the benefits of governmental activity need not bear the
burdens of governmental failures.
2. Deterrence
Using tort liability to deter a government actor—who ultimately
transfers the cost of damages to the citizenry—clearly differs from
using tort liability to deter an individual actor who must bear his own
costs. Despite the difficulties inherent in deterring government actors
through tort liability, achieving the desired deterrent effect is not
impossible. Yet the Bynum decision has little to no deterrent effect,
instead allowing a county to ignore its lawful duty to maintain
government buildings with complete impunity. This result fails to
further tort liability’s goal of deterrence in any way. Deterrence of
government actors takes one of two forms, each of which is discussed
in turn: voters leaving the tax base, or “foot voting”—similar to
shareholders selling their stock—and voters holding public officials
accountable at the ballot box.
Despite recent critiques of foot voting in protest of substantial
tort liability, the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the
scholars reacting to its decisions, have long accepted the idea that tort
liability can be counted upon to deter officials from engaging in
governmental misconduct in the same manner as private tort law.157
Critics of this theory correctly note that “shareholders of private
corporations . . . can readily sell their stock at any time, yet taxpayers
156. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980). Although this part of
Owen dealt more narrowly with the question of whether a city could claim a good-faith
defense for violation of a newly recognized constitutional right, id., the reasoning is
nonetheless more generally applicable—a fortiori the burden of damages that result from
government tortious conduct ought to be spread among all taxpayers rather than being
borne by the injured individual.
157. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 824 & nn.110–11.
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must fund essentially unlimited liability and face substantial costs if
they wish to ‘exit’ the jurisdictions that tax them to fund
governmental liabilities.”158 But nowhere in the various critiques of
this theory is it suggested that government liability has no effect on
the choices made by citizens to move in to or out of a particular
jurisdiction. It is not difficult to imagine the quality of public
buildings, roads, schools, and emergency services playing a factor in a
decision of whether and where to relocate—and each of these services
is a factor of the funds available after any hypothetical tort liability.159
A government that exposes itself to substantial tort liability will
inevitably experience a decline in its ability to provide other
government services160 that could spur “foot voting” among citizens
with certain minimum expectations regarding the provision of
services from their municipality. Thus, the admittedly limited ability
(at least compared to shareholders of publicly traded companies) of
citizens to “vote with their feet” still provides more of a deterrent
than the post-Bynum system’s complete absence of any deterrent
effect.
In addition to relocating, voters can also deter tortious
government conduct via the ballot box. Critics of this approach to
justifying governmental tort liability suggest that government officials
already have an incentive to keep the public safe since, even in the
absence of tort liability, government officials will presumably be
voted out of office if they fail to protect their citizens.161 This
158. Id. at 825–26.
159. Even those who suggest that the limited ability of individuals to relocate reduces
the deterrent effect on local governments to avoid tort liability admit that “at least some
businesses and individuals are able to opt out of the local political process by moving to a
different location, and . . . new businesses and residents are always free to select their
desired location.” Id. at 847; see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 155 (2007) (theorizing that so long as moving costs are
low, local governments and their monopoly service-providing bureaus will be subject to
adequate competitive pressure to ensure responsiveness and the lowest-cost provision of
services); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22–38, 71 (1981) (identifying the primary
interest of a city as its overall economic productivity, which in turn depends on
maintaining a favorable average ratio of benefits received to taxes paid—particularly for
those who pay a disproportionate share of taxes and are therefore the most mobile);
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956) (positing that the mobile consumer-voter chooses from among local governments
the one that best provides the public goods on which he places the greatest premium, such
as schools, “beaches, parks, police protection, roads, and parking facilities”).
160. Alternatively, the locality could alleviate any shortfall through increased taxes,
although that move is arguably more likely to be noticed and poorly received by the
citizenry than a marginal decline in the provision of government services.
161. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 848 (“[P]olitical vulnerability . . . can be at least as
important as the threat of damages liability.”).
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argument presumes that the imposition of tort liability does little to
change or enhance the deterrent effect government officials already
experience through voter accountability. To support this conclusion,
these critics point to major catastrophes like the 1947 Port of Texas
City disaster that killed 560 people, wounded 3000, and caused
damages of over $300 million,162 or the government’s failure to
foresee and repair the problems that inevitably led to the collapse of
the levees protecting New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.163 Noting that “political forces come powerfully into play
when the government endangers the public’s safety,” scholars are
quick to point out that “[a]ny instance of government bungling that
compromises the public’s safety is likely to have potent political
consequences.”164
There is certainly little doubt that voters did not need the added
incentive of tort damages in order to hold government officials
responsible for their failure to keep the public safe in either event.
However, the aforementioned examples are highly visible,
catastrophic, and large-scale events, whereas the events that tort
liability has the tendency to deter occur on a smaller stage and with
less public scrutiny. Therefore, it is essential that tort liability spark
the deterrent effect where voter accountability is not likely to do so.
As noted by one scholar, when citizens pursue claims against the
government “valuable information is unearthed and exposed” and,
consequently, “[w]ith exposure comes publicity.”165 Indeed, the
observations of these critics are perhaps the strongest evidence of the
need for government liability in cases exactly like that of Mr.
Bynum—where awareness, and corresponding outrage, are most
likely to be lacking.

162. See generally BILL MINUTAGLIO, CITY OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION THAT
DEVASTATED A TEXAS TOWN AND IGNITED A HISTORIC LEGAL BATTLE (2004) (giving
an account of the explosion and ensuing legal battles).
163. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 849; see also John Schwartz, Army Builders
TIMES
(June
2,
2006),
Accept
Blame
over
Flooding,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/02/us/nationalspecial/02corps.html (describing the Army
Corps of Engineers’ acceptance of responsibility for failing to adequately design and
maintain New Orleans’ levee system before Hurricane Katrina); John Schwartz, New
Study of Levees Faults Design and Construction, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/us/22corps.html (reporting on a study finding a
“complex web of public and private organizations” responsible for the failure of the levee
system).
164. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 850.
165. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–60 (2001).
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Considered in this light, tort liability serves two critical purposes
in allowing the public to deter governmental wrongdoing. First, by
threatening to divert resources from other projects the public cares
about, tort liability creates public awareness of the government’s
failure that would otherwise be missing. The voting public is
exceedingly more likely to care about—or even be aware of—Mr.
Bynum’s plight when it threatens to impact the funding of a
governmental program directly impacting the public. Second, a
finding of liability gives judicial credence and authority to the notion
that the government has failed in one of its basic obligations—
protecting the citizenry.166 Liability—and its corresponding award of
damages—signals to the voting public that the government has failed
to live up to its burden and that those responsible for that failure
should be held accountable at the ballot box. It is not enough to say
that these effects would be “indeterminate” or that they would be less
effective than in the realm of private tort law. What matters is that
they would provide some deterrence—something that is noticeably
absent under the current system established by Bynum.
The disconnect between the stated public policy rationales for
governmental immunity and the actual effect of the legislation put
forth by the general assembly and of the court’s decision in Bynum is
clear. It can no longer be said that the public policy of the state is to
protect citizen taxpayers from the nominal burden of compensating
individuals injured through the negligence of a municipality.167 The
general assembly has, for years, permitted counties to provide for the
compensation of injured individuals through insurance and risk
pooling agreements with a cost that is consistently borne by all
citizens of a locality.168 Moreover, the suggestion that high-profile
government misfeasance draws a fair comparison to less well-known
cases like those of Mr. Bynum is prima facie absurd. The prophylactic
exposure and publicity of a public suit and award of damages is a
necessary component of the deterrence of governmental neglect.

166. See, e.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317–18 (2d. Cir. 2000)
(“A judgment against a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its actions
and inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the patterns and practices
that led to constitutional violations, as well as alert the municipality and its citizenry to the
issue.”); Gilles, supra note 165, at 861 (“In addition to serving an informational function,
municipal liability claims serve a ‘fault-fixing’ function, localizing culpability in the
municipality itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative
measures.”).
167. See supra Section IV.B.
168. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the continued efficacy of governmental immunity in this state is
a barrier to both of the underlying goals of tort policy.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Bynum majority’s professed belief that its decision
rests squarely on the shoulders of a century’s worth of established
governmental immunity jurisprudence, the practical implication of
the holding is to render moot the very case law on which it claims to
be built. No longer is the City of Charlotte liable for damages where
the coliseum was clearly a proprietary activity.169 No longer does it
matter where in Pasquotank County’s park a citizen was injured.170
And no longer does it matter that, even though providing sewer
service is a governmental function, the act of contracting for sewer
construction is proprietary.171 Even more noteworthy than this
marked departure from governmental-immunity precedent is the
opinion’s modification of the doctrine despite the court’s long-held
belief that any such modification should come via legislation. Further,
the court fails to even acknowledge the sea of change that it has
unleashed.
Although the Bynum court departed significantly from precedent
by extending and clarifying the common-law barriers that insulate
government entities from accountability for their actions, the court
created a unique opportunity for the general assembly to revisit the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and definitively establish the public
policy of this state. It is incumbent upon the general assembly to
repeal this vestige of royal prerogative and restore the remedial rights
of its citizens that are mandated by the goals of tort law and
guaranteed by the state’s constitution.
STEFAN SCHROPP**
169. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 361, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin,
J., concurring) (contrasting the majority’s approach to sovereign immunity with the court’s
decision in Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965)).
170. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) (citing
Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366
N.C. 195, 732 S.E.2d 137 (2012)) (“In contrast, under the majority’s reasoning, it would
have been irrelevant in Estate of Williams that the County charged rental fees for use of
the ‘Swimming Hole’ in which the decedent drowned—because the property was owned
by the County . . . .”).
171. Town of Sandy Creek v. E. Coast Contracting, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 741
S.E.2d 673, 677 (2013).
** I am grateful to Alison Templeton for her initial guidance and support, to
Professor Judith Wegner for her direction when this piece was lacking it, and to Haley
Phillips and the rest of the Law Review staff for their thoughtful edits and comments at
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